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ABSTRACT
The main aim of this paper is to investigate how sexist ideology distorts 
our conceptions of sexual violence and the hermeneutical gaps such an 
ideology yields. I propose that we can understand the problematic issue of 
hermeneutical gaps about sexual violence with the help of Fricker’s theory 
of hermeneutical injustice. By distinguishing between hermeneutical 
injustice and hermeneutical misfire, we can distinguish between the 
hermeneutical gap and its consequences for the victim of sexual violence 
and those of the perpetrator of such violence. I then argue that perpe-
trators are both morally responsible and accountable for their acts, even if 
they are the result of a hermeneutical misfire. Ultimately, I show that with 
regard to sexual violence, we should opt for accountability to change the 
behaviour of the perpetrator and the social structure. Content warning: 
The paper discusses sexual violence and difficulties conceptualising 





blame; moral responsibility; 
accountability
1. Introduction
Many feminist philosophers argue that rape and sexual violence are elements of a broader sexist 
ideological framework (cf. Frye 1983, 1992; MacKinnon 1987, 1989; Hänel 2018a, 2018b; Manne 2018; 
Alcoff 2018). While these scholars differ in their theories, they all subscribe to the idea that a sexist, 
patriarchal, or male supremacist social structure underlies our everyday practices. I argue elsewhere that 
‘a sexist ideology is a social structure, constituted by ritualized social practices, and rationalized by 
a coherent cultural framework that organizes social agents into binary gender relations of domination 
and subordination’ (Hänel 2018b, 900). Additionally, said ideology ‘constrains our actions as well as our 
epistemic tools for interpreting those actions’ (902). Alcoff similarly argues that our experiences of sexual 
violence ‘are discursively and historically constituted [. . .] by the happenstance of the cultures we are born 
into’ (2018, 56) and that we are, in fact, socialised within rape cultures. Both myself and Alcoff take this to 
imply that we sometimes fail to make intelligible our experiences and actions both when it comes to 
experiencing and enacting sexual violence. Alcoff writes that perpetrators can genuinely experience ‘their 
victims as inviting the encounter, as not being harmed by it, or even enjoying it’ (Alcoff 2018, 56), but this 
is ‘only because of their socialization within rape cultures’ (57). I argue that some men fail to understand 
their actions due to the underlying sexist framework that distorts what counts as sexual violence by, for 
example, persistent rape myths and correlated stigmatisation of victims, as I show in the following section 
(cf. Hänel 2018b).
Research has shown that the more participants believe in rape myths,1 the more they blame the 
victim and the less they blame the perpetrator, and the closer the relationship between the victim 
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and the perpetrator the stronger this effect (cf. Krahé, Temkin, and Bieneck 2007). Furthermore, 
a 2004 study by Peterson and Muehlenhard found an interesting correlation between rape myths 
acceptance and the inability to label the experience adequately.2 According to the study, some of 
the women reported experiences that matched the legal definition of rape but were unwilling to 
label the experience as such. One might think that there are many reasons for victims of rape not to 
use this particular label to describe their experience. For example, psychological studies show that 
attaching the label ‘rape’ to an experience can hinder the healing process the victim is going through 
(cf. Draucker et al. 2009). Researchers Zoë Peterson and Charlene L. Muehlenhard also found, 
however, that some women who were unwilling to correctly label their experiences as rape were 
‘were more likely (a) to accept rape myths, and (b) to have been raped in circumstances which 
matched the rape myths they accepted’ (Jenkins 2016, 3). Their findings suggest a link between the 
acceptance of rape myths and the inability to understand one’s experience adequately. Katharine 
Jenkins draws a similar conclusion in a paper on rape myths as hermeneutical injustices, stating that 
the ‘research strongly suggests that one effect of rape myths is to prevent some victims of rape from 
conceptualising their experience as one of rape’ (2016, 3). Research such as this suggests that if we 
are all inculcated with sexist ideology, then all of us are influenced (in different ways and to different 
degrees) by rape myths and other false assumptions about sexual violence. Furthermore, some of us 
lack the adequate concepts necessary to understand sexual violence or articulate our experiences 
adequately.
Research also shows positive correlations between rape myth acceptance and sexual violence and 
coercion (cf. Klein, Kennedy, and Gorzalka 2008). Helmus, Kelly, and Karl (2013) note that cognitive 
distortions are a risk factor with predictive validity for sexual recidivism and that rape myth 
acceptance is one of these cognitive distortions. There is also evidence of rape myth acceptance 
amongst convicted rapists, using myths to rationalise their behaviours (Chiroro et al. 2004). If we 
assume that we all are shaped by sexist ideology as described above, it is only reasonable to assume 
that perpetrators of sexual violence are also affected by the distorted framework that the ideology 
provides.
If this is the case, one could feel tempted to argue that perpetrators are not responsible for their 
violent acts. Such an argument, however, would be undesirable from a feminist, moral, and political 
perspective, as it obscures how we are responsible for our actions despite cognitive ideological 
distortions. When considering these deeply troubling problems, we can never forget that actual 
persons deeply and lastingly harm others through their acts of sexual violence and sexist ideology in 
general. Additionally, those harmed and those harming are often members of very specific social 
groups. Sexual violence is a gendered and often racialized crime. Cis-men mostly perpetrate sexual 
violence against women and gender non-conforming individuals, often from marginalised social 
groups with respect to race. On the other hand, we should take seriously the holistic and self- 
operative ways in which ideology works (more below) and consider questions of responsibility to 
find fruitful ways to dismantle the sexist ideology and to tackle sexual violence. In other words, we 
have to tread carefully – not allowing our questions to obscure the deeply harmful experiences of 
sexual violence while at the same time accurately presenting and critically discussing the ways in 
which sexist ideology distorts our conceptions of such violence.
Before I outline the structure of the paper, let me clarify that I here distinguish between (a) sexual 
violence that is in line with inaccurate but persistent rape myths and, hence, committed in full 
knowledge even by perpetrator who believe in such myths and (b) sexual violence that is not in line 
with such myths and can, in some cases, as discussed above, not be made intelligible as acts of rape 
by victims as well as perpetrators alike. While the first describes cases that count as rape even within 
the sexist ideology and that are tracked by the dominant understanding of sexual violence (more 
about this below), the second describes cases in which the attacker should have known better but 
does not and in which their embeddedness in the sexist ideology might prevent them from doing so. 
In what follows, I exclusively discuss the second, and what I say should in no case be applied to cases 
that perpetrators commit with full knowledge, or in cases where there is verbal or physical refusal or 
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in which the victim is incapable of consent. However, most acts of sexual violence are not tracked by 
the dominant understanding of sexual violence, making this investigation even more important as it 
can highlight the problems of such a distorted understanding and propose possible solutions to it.
The main aim of this paper is to investigate how sexist ideology distorts our conceptions of such 
violence and the hermeneutical gaps such an ideology yields. I propose that we can understand the 
problematic issue of hermeneutical gaps with regard to sexual violence with the help of Fricker’s 
theory of hermeneutical injustice. In Section 1, I briefly show that victims of sexual violence are often 
also victims of hermeneutical injustice, i.e. they are incapable of understanding their own experi-
ences adequately and they fail to make their experiences intelligible to others. But if we assume – 
and there are good reasons to do so – that we are all to some extent inculcated with sexist ideology, 
then it seems plausible to say that not merely victims but also perpetrators suffer from the distorted 
collective hermeneutical resource to make their experiences intelligible.3 In Section 2, I argue that 
there is a difference between the cognitive disadvantage of the victim and the perpetrator. The 
perpetrator, unlike the victim, suffers not from hermeneutical injustice but hermeneutical misfiring. 
In Section 3, I consider the question of blame and moral responsibility for actions performed under 
hermeneutical misfiring and responsibility for hermeneutical injustice. To do so, I highlight the 
distinction between backward-looking and forward-looking responsibility. I argue that perpetrators 
have forward-looking responsibility by drawing on Iris Marion Young’s theory of political responsi-
bility and insights from community accountability practices.
2. Hermeneutical Injustice within Sexist Ideology
If we assume – and we have good reasons to do so (cf. Hänel 2018a, 2018b) – that we live within 
a society stamped by sexist ideology, then we can also reasonably assume that there are conse-
quences for theories of hermeneutical injustice as laid out by Fricker. According to Fricker’s theory, 
due to a distorted hermeneutical resource, victims of sexual harassment and women who experience 
postnatal depression cannot adequately understand or communicate their suffering. We can trans-
late this theory to cases of sexual violence: because of so-called rape myths and other false 
assumptions about sexual violence, victims sometimes cannot make intelligible their own experi-
ences of sexual violence. Hence, they suffer both from the violent acts themselves as well as from 
their inability to understand and articulate their experiences. This inability can lead to self-blame and 
lack of trust in their interpretative and epistemic capacities.4
Jenkins (2016, 2) argues that rape myths, such as the myth that ‘rape always involves over-
whelming physical force, and that victims of rape always physically resist their attacker,’ constitute 
hermeneutical injustice. According to her, ‘rape myths are inaccurate perceptions concerning rape’ 
(Ibid.). She then draws our attention to research that strongly suggests that victims who accept 
certain rape myths are less likely to understand their own experience of sexual violence accurately. In 
other words, rape myths can prevent victims from conceptualising their own rape as rape. Hence, 
they are likely also to suffer the consequences of hermeneutical injustice, which is ‘the injustice of 
having some significant area of one’s social experience obscured from collective understanding 
owing to hermeneutical marginalization’ (Fricker 2007, 158). While Jenkins focuses on how rape 
myths affect victims of sexual violence and causes them to suffer from hermeneutical injustice, this 
phenomenon is not necessarily limited to victims.
Laura Beeby (2011) points out that hermeneutical injustice is an epistemic problem and that we 
should be able to ask whether the perpetrator of sexual harassment (or, in our case, sexual violence) 
is a victim of hermeneutical injustice as well. Beeby draws our attention to why Fricker maintains 
that, in her example, Carmita Wood is a victim of hermeneutical injustice while the harasser is not. 
Carmita Wood suffered from sexual harassment at her workplace in the early 1970s at a time when 
there was no concept of sexual harassment. Due to the inability to adequately understand her 
experience and articulate it to others, she suffered significant physical and psychological distress as 
well as economic consequences when she finally – with no other options – left the job. It was 
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because of Carmita Wood and a group of other women that the term ‘sexual harassment’ was finally 
coined in an attempt to gain legal protection from unwelcome advances in the workplace. Fricker’s 
main idea is that there exists a collective hermeneutical resource that holds the concepts everyone 
can draw upon and that some people, depending on their social group membership, can contribute 
to the resource better than others. Because Carmita Wood was a black woman, her social group 
membership prevented her from contributing to the collective resource.5 Often, it is not that there is 
no concept available at all; rather, as in Wood’s case, the dominant interpretation of the behaviour is 
distorted because the collective resource more readily accepts the contributions of men – including 
harassers – than those suffering from the harassment. This represents a problem of epistemic 
ignorance.6 Mostly, it is not in the interest of the privileged to understand the suffering of the 
oppressed in accurate terms. And it is this asymmetry that Fricker focuses on in her theory.
Beeby argues that both Carmita Wood and her harasser suffer from a cognitive disadvantage – in 
fact, they suffer from the same cognitive disadvantage: they lack the concept of sexual harassment 
due to a gap in the collective (or, as I prefer, dominant) hermeneutical resource. Yet, Beeby takes this 
thought a step further in arguing that both Wood and her harasser are thus ‘affected by a climate of 
hermeneutical marginalization’ because they are ‘vulnerable to failures of understanding and com-
munication’ (2011, 482). And, if this is the case, then both might be suffering from hermeneutical 
injustice. Clearly, this is not what Fricker would say. Fricker makes it very clear that Carmita Wood is 
wronged in a way that her harasser is not. But, according to Beeby, this difference between Wood 
and her harasser is not epistemic disadvantages, but background conditions such as sexism that put 
Wood in a position of marginalisation. With respect to the epistemic disadvantages, they are, Beeby 
argues, on a par.7 And so it might be possible to think that Wood’s perpetrator might be both 
a perpetrator of sexual violence and a victim of hermeneutical injustice. According to Beeby, we 
could ask, ‘Would the harasser’s behaviour have been different if he had a sufficient understanding of 
gender roles in the workplace?’ (484). Beeby here focuses exclusively on the epistemic dimension of 
hermeneutical injustice and argues that ‘under certain circumstances’ the harasser’s behaviour could 
‘be seen as a tragedy or injustice’ (485). Thus, she claims, we should change Fricker’s account such 
that it is distinctly about epistemic injustice and not a fusion of ethical, social, and epistemic 
problems.
Instead of reducing hermeneutical injustices to purely epistemic problems, I want to suggest that 
it is indeed the case that perpetrators (can) suffer from hermeneutical gaps without also making 
them victims of hermeneutical injustice. In fact, even when we concentrate, as Beeby proposes, 
exclusively on the epistemic dimension of hermeneutical injustice, we cannot dismiss the social 
background conditions as it is due to those conditions that the gap in the hermeneutical resource 
exists in the first place. I propose instead to distinguish between hermeneutical injustices and what 
I call ‘hermeneutical misfiring’. By ‘hermeneutical misfiring,’ I mean having one’s significant experi-
ence obscured from the collective understanding without being hermeneutically marginalised 
oneself. This, hopefully, makes it possible to explicate and critique the workings of sexist ideology 
without putting victims and perpetrators on a par and risking making excuses for what is 
inexcusable.
Laura Beeby seeks an account that ‘allows us to see the breadth of damage done by epistemic 
injustice: both more powerful and less powerful people are epistemically compromised by distor-
tions and deficits in the communal resource’ (2011, 485). While this is an interesting move towards 
understanding the ways in which everyone is affected by sexist ideology, I think it misrepresents the 
epistemic character of Wood’s suffering. Even though both Wood and her harasser lack the concepts 
necessary to understand their behaviour and experience, it is Wood who suffers secondary epistemic 
disadvantages, not her harasser. She might come to doubt her epistemic capacities, her capabilities 
of making sense of the world, her epistemic self-confidence, and so on. In fact, as I argue elsewhere, 
not being able to understand significant experiences – such as sexual violence – can seriously restrict 
one’s self-development and identity formation (Hänel 2020). Hence, the secondary epistemic 
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disadvantages that Wood suffers from are deeply problematic and go well beyond the ‘mere’ lack of 
understanding a given incident.
3. Hermeneutical Injustice versus Hermeneutical Misfire
What is needed is an account that allows us to understand how people with more and with less 
power are differently affected by sexist ideology. Drawing on work in feminist philosophy of 
pornography, I suggest that we can capture these differences by distinguishing between herme-
neutical injustice and what I call ‘hermeneutical misfiring’.8 Hornsby and Langton (1998) as well as 
Langton (1993) argue that pornographic speech can silence women in contexts in which it is of 
utmost importance for them not to be silenced, that is, in situations where they cannot refuse 
unwanted sex. In more detail, Langton and Hornsby show that pornographic speech can illocutio-
narily silence women’s speech acts; a woman’s verbal ‘no’ intended to refuse unwanted sex can 
misfire due to specific communicative conditions brought about by pornography. In these cases, 
women’s refusal does not count as a refusal because it lacks uptake.9 The idea is that due to 
pornographic speech (which, for example, forms the expectation that women mean ‘yes’ when 
they say ‘no’), the hearer fails to understand the woman’s ‘no’ as an act of refusal. The utterance 
misfires; the woman is silenced.
I contend that the pornography case runs parallel to the cases I am interested in here. Due to 
sexist ideology, there is a gap or distortion in our dominant hermeneutical resource. Victims and 
perpetrators of sexual violence may fail to understand their experiences and behaviour adequately. 
In the case of victims, this is an instance of hermeneutical injustice. I propose that in the case of 
perpetrators, this is an instance of hermeneutical misfiring. Due to rape myths, perpetrators may be 
unable to understand their behaviour for what it is and, hence, fail to understand passiveness of the 
victim as intended refusal. Note that the focus here is not on the intended act of refusal that misfires 
(as in the pornography case above) but on hermeneutical misfiring. The perpetrator has a mistaken 
understanding of the situation; his conceptual grasp of what is going on misfires. This I call ‘herme-
neutical misfiring’.
While someone has to be hermeneutically marginalised to be a victim of hermeneutical injustice, 
this is not the case with hermeneutical misfiring. In cases of hermeneutical misfiring, a person either 
uses wrong or distorted conceptual tools to understand a significant experience. Hermeneutical 
misfiring thus explains what happens when both the victim and the perpetrator of sexual violence 
suffer from a hermeneutical distortion or cognitive gap. While cases of hermeneutical misfiring can 
have serious consequences, they do not amount to cases of injustice. This is due to the fact that they 
describe what goes wrong epistemically without yet taking into account the background conditions 
of social injustice. In other words, while victims of hermeneutical injustice suffer from a cognitive 
gap, they also suffer from being unable to contribute to the dominant hermeneutical resource, to 
resist dominant interpretations of their experiences, to develop epistemic confidence, and to align 
their sense of moral injury with descriptions of the experience. These sufferings are mostly due to 
their social position of power and the very structural ways in which their experiences cannot access 
the dominant hermeneutical resource. Hermeneutical misfiring, on the other hand, describes merely 
the cognitive gap that can result in deeply problematic experiences as well as deeply problematic 
behaviour. Thus, in some cases, Beeby might be right. A perpetrator might act differently had they 
access to adequate concepts and, hence, were not to suffer from hermeneutical misfiring.
Hermeneutical misfiring, in the case of perpetrators, often stems from epistemic ignorance. 
Epistemic ignorance is structural and, as such, has effects on knowledge production, epistemic 
credibility, and social injustice. Here, I am interested in its effects on social injustice and knowledge 
production. That is, it is due to epistemic ignorance that there is no adequate concept for sexual 
violence in the dominant hermeneutical resource. The relation of epistemic ignorance and social 
injustice suggests that epistemic ignorance is not merely an epistemic matter but, similar to 
hermeneutical injustice, fuses epistemic and political (or ethical) problems. It may seem that, 
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contrary to what I have been arguing above, hermeneutical misfiring cannot be a purely epistemic 
problem. A possible answer is that hermeneutical misfiring is a case of structural epistemic ignor-
ance – that is, it is due to the position of social power that the perpetrator is ignorant of their 
behaviour. If this is the case, then I would need to revise my account of hermeneutical misfiring to 
argue it occurs when a person, due to their epistemic ignorance (stemming from a social position of 
power and privilege), either uses wrong or distorted conceptual tools to understand a significant 
experience.10 This new definition raises the question of whether the epistemic ignorance at play is 
wilful ignorance or whether it is what might be called ‘ideological ignorance’. For now, I understand 
wilful ignorance as a carefully constructed oblivion that helps to maintain dominance or privilege. (cf. 
Bailey 2007; Mills 2007; Sullivan and Tuana 2007) Ideological ignorance, on the other hand, is an 
internalised ignorance that helps to maintain structural injustices, perhaps close to what is called 
‘false consciousness’ in critical theory. The significant difference is that the former would imply that 
the social agent is responsible for his lack of understanding – even if such lack is due to structural 
reasons. The latter suggests that the social agent is so deeply embedded in the ideological structure 
that they are incapable of seeing beyond the distorted and limited dominant hermeneutical 
resource. I consider this question in the next section.
4. Holding Perpetrators Accountable
So far, I have argued that there is a difference between the cognitive disadvantage of the victim and 
the perpetrator. I have also proposed that the perpetrator does not suffer from hermeneutical 
injustice, but does suffer from hermeneutical misfiring. I now want to turn to the issue of moral 
responsibility. How can we be accountable for our actions if we suffer from a lack of understanding? 
I briefly suggest that perpetrators ought to be accountable for their actions even if performed under 
conditions of hermeneutical misfiring. For the remainder of the paper, I draw a distinction between 
backward-looking and forward-looking responsibility. Focusing on the latter, and drawing on the 
theory of political responsibility by Iris Marion Young, I argue that perpetrators have forward-looking 
responsibility.11
I have argued above that hermeneutical misfiring happens when a person, due to their epistemic 
ignorance (stemming from a social position of power and privilege), uses wrong or distorted 
conceptual tools to understand a significant experience. Hence, we have to say something about 
the perpetrator’s ability to draw conclusions as to whether they are responsible. For now, I assume 
that the perpetrator acts in the way they do because of ideological ignorance; they have a cognitive 
gap due to wrong or distorted concepts of sexual violence in the dominant hermeneutical resource. 
They might even act differently had they access to other concepts. If I can show that an ideologically 
ignorant perpetrator is responsible, then a wilfully ignorant perpetrator is responsible too, yet this 
does not necessarily hold vice versa. Furthermore, the question of responsibility can be divided into 
two separate, but related questions: (1) Is the perpetrator responsible for the hermeneutical injustice 
from which the victim suffers? According to Fricker, hermeneutical injustice is a structural injustice 
and, as such, does not involve a culprit. To involve a culprit, injustice needs to stem from someone’s 
wrongful act. However, the injustice of hermeneutical injustice stems from the subject’s hermeneu-
tical marginalisation, i.e., the social – and, in Carmita Wood’s case, sexist and racist – background 
conditions. (2) Is the perpetrator responsible for a wrongful act done under conditions of ignorance? 
While some of what I say touches on (1), I here concentrate on (2).
How can we be responsible for our actions if performed under conditions of hermeneutical 
misfire? In mainstream philosophy, moral responsibility and blameworthiness are often coupled. 
Roughly, we are held morally responsible for our action if we are blameworthy for it. For example, 
according to Peter Strawson (2008), Gideon Rosen (2003) and others,12 we can say that a person is 
responsible for an act if the person is liable to be blamed for the act. Yet, in some contexts, ignorance 
can serve as an excuse. For example, Rosen distinguishes cases in which a person (a) is ignorant and 
blameless and (b) ignorant but blameworthy, i.e., at fault for their own not knowing. In the first case, 
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a person fails to know the wrong they are doing, and there is no way that they should have known. In 
the second case, the person could and should have known and is therefore at fault for not knowing. 
In these cases – in which someone is wilfully ignorant – the ignorance is culpable and cannot serve as 
an excuse in the above sense. Accordingly, an action done from culpable ignorance is itself culpable. 
Thus, one can ask whether ideological ignorance should be considered culpable or non-culpable. 
While this is mainly a question about the holism of sexist ideology, we can look at recent work on 
epistemic ignorance and white ignorance in particular for guidance here, i.e. the idea that white 
social agents are epistemically unable to recognise and understand their racial identities, experi-
ences, and social position. Drawing on this literature, I briefly present two arguments for why, 
contrary to Rosen and others, perpetrators of sexual violence are responsible for their acts even if 
performed under conditions of hermeneutical misfire. First, because there are many countervailing 
reasons for ignorance. Second, because holding on to ignorance in light of such reasons is wilful 
ignorance, and thus an active practice that functions to maintain one’s powerful social position.13
First, as Medina (2012) and Mason (2011) have pointed out, there is not one but many herme-
neutical resources from which we can draw our concepts. Medina argues for a pluralistic analysis of 
different interpretative communities and expressive practices that co-exist in social contexts. In fact, 
he argues that ‘social silences and hermeneutical gaps are misrepresented if they are uniformly 
predicated of an entire social context’ (2012, 201). Hence, when we think of which concepts are 
available to us, we have to consider that many of the needed concepts are actually available in other 
sub-communities. Thus, one reason for our ignorance is that our social power and privilege make it 
unnecessary for us to know about these resources. In other words, individuals in powerful social 
positions often lack the necessary experiences through which they could learn that they act wrongly 
or hold distorted views and concepts. They also lack the interests and necessity to educate 
themselves about other experiences (cf. Pohlhaus 2012). Instead, they put their own interests over 
others’ interests, maintaining their powerful social positions as well as their ignorance. This, however, 
is a bad excuse. After all, it leads to more suffering of those who already suffer and more ignorance of 
those who are already ignorant. The luck of being in a powerful and privileged social position should 
come with sensibility towards and responsibility for injustices against the less fortunate.
Rosen, on the other hand, thinks that awareness of counterarguments or other resources is not 
yet sufficient for being able to change one’s cognitive framework (Rosen 2003, 67). But why not? 
Considering that our society is immensely complex and deeply fragmented and, thus, that there are 
not only sexist views – although these might be the dominant ones – but also a vast range of feminist 
or otherwise egalitarian views opposing sexism, is it really too much to hold each other to high 
standards? Or, asked differently, is the standard not to hold sexist views really that high and 
demanding? It is true that sexist ideology runs deep and, in fact, part of what makes the ideology 
pervasive is that despite the counterarguments, those in the grip of its sexist views find evidence and 
encouragement at every corner.14 Yet, especially in light of vast social movements such as #MeToo 
and changing norms of how to navigate the world, not critically questioning one’s beliefs means to 
stay ignorant actively.
Second, Pohlhaus Jr. argues convincingly that while we cannot transcend our situatedness, we 
can change the direction of our gaze and our interests. In her words, ‘with habitual practice epistemic 
resources can make more evident to the knower that which is not immediately obvious from her 
position in the world’ (2012, 729). Thus, being and staying ignorant is not what necessarily follows 
from one’s specific social position and embeddedness within the sexist ideology, but rather ‘is 
a wilful refusal to acknowledge and to acquire the necessary tools for knowing parts of the world’ 
(Ibid.). Epistemic ignorance is often an active social practice (cf. Alcoff 2007). Being wilfully ignorant is 
a choice. Or, as Moody-Adams argues, it is ‘ignorance of what can and should already be known’ 
(1999, 180, emphasis added). And as such, wilful ignorance is an obstacle to moral progress that is 
rooted in the social structures of sexist ideology but is not impossible to overcome. Rather, it is our 
responsibility as moral agents to do so.
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I have suggested that there are good reasons for why we are responsible for our actions despite 
acting under conditions of hermeneutical misfiring. Furthermore, there is an important pragmatic 
suggestion to be made in light of moral responsibility in regard to sexual violence. If Rosen’s 
discussion of ideological views tells us anything, it is that individuals in the grip of a pervasive 
ideology will need a learning process that brings them to question their previously accepted views 
critically. Yet recent psychological research suggests that shame and resentment have more negative 
outcomes than positive ones. Blame can lead to rejection, anger, shame, hopelessness, or despera-
tion, feelings that undermine responsibility (cf. Barrett, Zahn-Waxler, and Cole 1993; Peters et al. 
2014; Stuewig et al. 2010; Tangney and Dearing 2002; Tangney et al. 1992; Thomaes et al. 2011; 
Wright, Gudjonsson, and Young 2008; Oakberg 2016). These feelings are especially important for 
understanding sexual violence since the defence mechanism of externalising blame can lead to 
victim-blaming and reproduction of sexist views. Especially in contexts where we want to enable 
learning and change, ‘it is essential to maintain responsibility and accountability [but] to avoid 
blame’ (Pickard 2014, 10; see also 2011; Lamb 1999). Hence, blame is a bad advisor when it comes to 
rape myths, as the problem with rape myths and other sexist beliefs is that individuals hold them 
persistently against evidence. To counteract them requires a more serious, critical learning process.15 
I am offering a pragmatic suggestion to refrain from blame in some contexts in light of psychological 
research. I am not, however, arguing that perpetrators of sexual violence are blameless as such.
Putting the question of blame aside, I propose to make use of the distinction of backward-looking 
and forward-looking responsibility. Roughly, backward-looking responsibility makes ‘responsibility out 
to be a matter of having caused an existing – morally problematic – state of affairs’ (Smiley 2014, 1), 
such as having sexually violated another person. Forward-looking responsibility makes ‘responsibility 
out to be a matter of being morally charged with – responsible for – bringing about a state of affairs 
which we as a community take to be desirable’ (Ibid.). Often the distinction between backward- and 
forward-looking responsibility is drawn in response to questions of collective responsibility, with 
backward-looking responsibility geared towards reparations and forward-looking responsibility 
oriented towards redressing structural injustices. However, many of the insights in regard to forward- 
looking responsibility can be helpful in our case. With the help of Iris Marion Young’s theory of political 
responsibility, which is forward-looking, I argue that perpetrators of sexual violence have forward- 
looking responsibility and that this responsibility extends to the others in a more structural way.
Young’s theory of political responsibility focuses on structural injustice for which there is not one 
agent guilty but a conglomerate of social practices, institutional rules, and individual action. In these 
cases, Young argues that we should turn to a concept of shared (future) responsibility. An agent is 
responsible in this manner ‘if (a) the agent is causally embedded in processes that produce 
a problematic result and (b) the agent is in a position to assume ongoing forward-looking respon-
sibility (in cooperation with others) for ameliorating those conditions’ (Young 2011, xx, see also 
Chapter 4). In other words, ‘[t]o ascribe responsibility to a person is to say that they have a job to do’ 
(2011, xv). Let us see how this plays out with regard to perpetrators of sexual violence. Clearly, the 
agent is causally embedded in the very (physical) process that produced the morally problematic 
result; in fact, the agent directly caused the problematic result even if they have done so via 
hermeneutical misfire. This is why, as I have hinted above, many would hold the perpetrator 
blameworthy such that they would also apply backward-looking responsibility to them. Yet, here, 
the question is not about whether they are blameworthy but whether they are causally related to the 
problematic result, such that we can say that they have forward-looking responsibility. Furthermore, 
as Young’s theory originally focuses on collective or shared responsibility, we can say that the 
perpetrator is causally related to the act of sexual violence in two ways. First, they directly caused 
the particular act of violence against another person. Second, they partake in a sexist ideology that is 
reproduced by violent practices and the ignorance or justification of such violence. Furthermore, the 
agent is also in a position to take on forward-looking responsibility for ameliorating these proble-
matic conditions. They can (a) help the victim in her healing process, for example, by making 
amends, by taking therapy or simply by staying out of the way, and (b) they can help dismantle 
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the enabling conditions of sexist ideology. Here, my arguments about with regard to epistemic 
ignorance play a significant role. I have argued that perpetrators of sexual violence acting under 
conditions of hermeneutical misfire are epistemically ignorant due to their social position of power 
and privilege. Being in a social position of power and privilege allows them to have their voices 
count, to contribute to the dominant hermeneutical resources, and, thus, to change the background 
conditions that make sexual violence prevalent.16
Obviously, for powerful actors to help dismantle sexist ideology and for a perpetrator to change 
the direction of their gaze and interest, a long process of critical reflection must take place. It is here 
that we come full circle. As I have argued above, such a process of critical reflection both on one’s 
problematic moral actions and sexist ideology might be achieved better in the absence of blame. 
Instead, it is better to foreground these reflections in the idea of shared responsibility. The notion of 
shared responsibility is also the focus of community-based approaches, such as community account-
ability when addressing sexual and intimate violence without relying on the state or notions of 
victimisation, heteronormativity, sexism, and white supremacy.17 This practice has a long history 
within communities of women of colour, indigenous women, undocumented female immigrants, 
and refugees, who were historically (and in most cases still are) unable to seek help from legal 
institutions for various reasons, including racism and sexism.
According to Kelly (2010), community accountability ‘popularizes the idea that when sexual violence 
takes place, everyone is affected’. Taking accountability or forward-looking responsibility highlights how 
the community is involved in changing the problematic background conditions; it is a process that 
involves the perpetrator as well as the community. It asks perpetrators to recognise the harm they have 
caused (even if the harm was caused unintentionally, as it is the case under hermeneutical misfiring). It 
also asks perpetrators to acknowledge the harm of the victim and the community and their respective 
needs, to take steps of restitution towards the victim and the community, and to develop skills to prevent 
further harms. Furthermore, it is the community’s responsibility to prevent future harm, to help the victim 
in their needs, and to help the perpetrator to develop skills to prevent further harm. For the perpetrator to 
develop skills to prevent further harms and for the community to help with this task is in line with the idea 
that in cases of ideological ignorance, perpetrators need to learn how to critically question sexist beliefs 
like rape myths and use their social position – to the best of their ability and position – to make a change 
in the social structure and the dominant hermeneutical resource. Hence, both Young’s theory of political 
responsibility and the insights from community accountability allow us to place forward-looking respon-
sibility both on the perpetrator and their community. This is important since the focus on blame and 
backward-looking responsibility directed at an individual agent often distracts from the background 
conditions of sexist ideology and the future tasks involved in changing these conditions, as Young so 
impressively and rigorously argues.
Notes
1. Rape myths are ‘inaccurate perceptions concerning rape’ (Jenkins 2016, 2) and include, for example, the myth 
that rape is only committed by strangers or that rape always involves aggravated physical force and that victims 
always resist their attacker. See Hänel 2018, chapter 1 for a detailed explanation.
2. See also Peterson and Muehlenhard (2011), Furthermore, it should be kept in mind that coming to terms with 
one’s traumatic memory is a long process; sometimes it can take years for victims to label the given experience 
one of rape (cf. Littleton and Grills-Taquechel 2011; Artime, McCallum, and Peterson 2014; Harned 2005; Wilson 
and Miller 2016). Alcoff (2018) provides a thorough account of this.
3. It is hard to feel any sympathy with a perpetrator of sexual violence even when they suffered from hermeneutical 
misfiring, by which I mean a gap in the collective resource that cannot be overcome (for example, due to social 
privileges). And it is good that our feeling of sympathy is not easily forthcoming. We should hold on to the anger 
we instead feel towards perpetrators of sexual violence. However, part of the reason why our sympathy is not 
forthcoming is because we often think of cases of physically violent forms of rape when hearing the term ‘sexual 
violence’. Indeed, it happens on a regular basis that other acts of sexual violence are not even seen as sexual 
violence. And in these other and less aggravated cases, sympathy or himpathy (Manne 2018) for the violator is 
quite common and often involves questioning the innocence of the victim and whether the act in question 
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really was an act of sexual violence. In other words, it is not because we want to excuse the behaviour of violators 
that we should engage with extremely hard questions of ideological distortion, responsibility, and blame-
worthiness, but because we have to confront a social reality in which most acts of sexual violence are not 
acknowledged as sexual violence.
4. In a different paper, I show how the testimonial and hermeneutical injustice that victims of sexual violence often 
experience can lead to further losses and hinder victim’s self-development and self-recognition (Hänel 2020).
5. Others have pointed out that Fricker is mistaken in assuming something like a collective hermeneutical resource 
and that this notion obscures the ways in which marginalised and oppressed social groups have their own 
concepts with which to understand and articulate their experiences. (cf. Medina 2012; Mason 2011) Although it 
is crucial to point to the very diverse ways in which members of marginalised groups contribute to hermeneu-
tical resources and in which privileged groups are ignorant of already existing concepts, what is important for 
the content of the paper is the idea that there is a dominant resource that influences our lives. Think about rape 
myths and the way we take them on board or critically position ourselves against them – either way, they 
influence our behaviour, our experiences, and our possibilities to understand and articulate both.
6. I say more about epistemic and wilful ignorance below.
7. I will come to this in the next section as it seems far from obvious to me that they are.
8. I develop a detailed account of the difference between hermeneutical injustice and hermeneutical misfire along 
these lines in a different paper.
9. Bird (2002) has critiqued this view, arguing that uptake is not necessary for an act to count as refusal. Here, I am 
merely interested in motivating the notion of misfire for the purposes at hand.
10. This implies that victims of hermeneutical injustice are not necessarily also victims of hermeneutical misfiring; 
often, hermeneutically marginalised groups are not in a social position of power and privilege that makes them 
epistemically ignorant in the ways I have outlined.
11. I consider the question of blame only fleetingly. I take up this question in more detail in another paper as well as 
in my book (Hänel 2018a).
12. See Smith (1983); Zimmerman (1997); Wündisch (2017), to name only a few. Note that my suggestions draw 
mainly on Rosen and offer only a cursory picture of moral responsibility, blame and culpability; nevertheless, 
I hope that a thorough analysis of the issue could draw on my brief suggestions here.
13. Here, I will not dive deeper into the debate on moral responsibility but merely consider writings within the 
debate of epistemic ignorance. I should mention though, that even within the debate on moral responsibility 
and blameworthiness, some argue that ignorance alone is not an indicator for being blameless. For example, 
Mason (2015) argues that moral ignorance can be a form of bad will and, hence, agents can be blameworthy 
even when ignorant.
14. See Hänel (2018a) for a more detailed discussion.
15. I here concentrate on the psychological research. See Baldwin (1998); Arendt (2003); and Young (2011) for 
philosophical accounts of why blame and guilt can be counterproductive. Note that Bierria (2010) brings into 
focus another aspect of why we should avoid blame in specific contexts. She argues that blame can put 
especially black women in a deeply problematic position in so far as they have an impossible choice to make: 
betray the feminist movement or betray the black movement (by reproducing problematic stereotypes about 
black men). Furthermore, Young (2011) argues that by pinning blame on one individual, we often absolve others 
and ignore the shared responsibility that we have as a collective; this seems fitting in light of the fact that the 
sexist ideology for which we all bear responsibility plays a role in the pervasiveness of sexual violence.
16. See May and Strikwerda (1994) on collective responsibility for rape.
17. Philosophers have started to turn to these insights in recent years. For example, according to Zheng, we can 
distinguish between responsibility as attributability and responsibility as accountability. Responsibility as 
accountability ‘depends on the social and institutional practices governing the distribution of duties and 
burdens across different roles and positions within a society’ (2016, 62). Accordingly, a person X is morally 
responsible for their actions only when they can be held accountable for them; that is, when ‘it is appropriate for 
others to enforce certain expectations and demands on those actions’ (63).
Acknowledgments
I am deeply thankful to Melanie Altanian and all the participants of the ‘Epistemic Injustice in the Aftermath of Collective 
Wrongdoing’ workshop that took place in December 2019 in Bern. Furthermore, I want to thank Seunghyun Song and 
Natalie Ashton, a then anonymous reviewer, for their helpful comments that urged me to think more thoroughly about 
some of the claims in the paper. I also want to thank Jenny Saul and the participants of the Sheffield Writing Workshop 
in 2016 for feedback on a very early (and utterly different) draft of this paper. Additionally, I’d like to thank Mari Mikkola 
for helping to coin the term ‘hermeneutical misfire’ and (as always) valuable feedback on early ideas that finally led to 
this paper. Finally, as always, I am grateful to Jacob Blumenfeld for discussion and help with the final manuscript.
10 H. HÄNEL
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
References
Alcoff, L. 2007. “Epistemologies of Ignorance: Three Types.” In Race and the Epistemologies of Ignorance, edited by 
S. Sullivan and N. Tuana, 39–58. Albany: SUNY Press.
Alcoff, L. 2018. Rape and Resistance. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Arendt, H. 2003. Responsibility and Judgment. New York: Schocken.
Artime, T., E. McCallum, and Z. Peterson. 2014. “Men’s Acknowledgement of Their Sexual Victimization Experiences.” 
Psychology of Men & Masculinity 15 (3): 313–323. doi:10.1037/a0033376.
Bailey, A. 2007. “Strategic Ignorance.” In Race and the Epistemologies of Ignorance, edited by S. Sullivan and N. Tuana, 
77–94. Albany: SUNY Press.
Baldwin, J. 1998. “The White Man’s Guilt.” In Collected Essays, 722–727. New York: Literary Classics.
Barrett, K., C. Zahn-Waxler, and P. Cole. 1993. “Avoiders Vs. Amenders: Implications for the Investigation of Guilt and 
Shame during Toddlerhood.” Cognition & Emotion 7: 481–505. doi:10.1080/02699939308409201.
Beeby, L. 2011. “A Critique of Hermeneutical Injustice.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111: 479–486. doi:10.2307/ 
41331561.
Bierria, A. 2010. “‘Where Them Bloggers At?’: Reflections on Rihanna, Accountability, and Survivor Subjectivity.” Social 
Justice 37 (4): 101–125. doi:10.2307/41478937.
Bird, A. 2002. “Illocutionary Silencing.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83: 1–15. doi:10.1111/1468-0114.00137.
Chiroro, P., G. Bohner, T. Viki, and C. Jarvis. 2004. “Rape Myth Acceptance and Rape Proclivity: Expected Dominance 
versus Expected Arousal as Mediators in Acquaintance-Rape Situations.” Journal of Interpersonal Violence 19 (4): 
427–442. doi:10.1177/0886260503262081.
Draucker, C., D. Martsolf, R. Ross, C. Cook, A. Stidham, and P. Mweemba. 2009. “The Essence of Healing from Sexual 
Violence: A Qualitative Metasynthesis.” Research in Nursing & Health 32 (4): 366–378. doi:10.1002/nur.20333.
Fricker, M. 2007. Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Frye, M. 1983. The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory. New York: Crossing Press.
Frye, M. 1992. Willful Virgin: Essays in Feminism. New York: Crossing Press.
Hänel, H. 2018a. What Is Rape? Social Theory and Conceptual Analysis. Bielefeld: transcript.
Hänel, H. 2018b. “What Is a Sexist Ideology.” Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5 (34): 899–921. doi:10.3998/ 
ergo.12405314.0005.034.
Hänel, H. 2020. “Hermeneutical Injustice, (Self-)recognition, and Academia.” Hypatia 35 (2): 1–19. doi:10.1017/ 
hyp.2020.3.
Harned, M. 2005. “Understanding Women’s Labeling of Unwanted Sexual Experiences with Dating Partners.” Violence 
Against Women 11 (3): 374–413. doi:10.1177/1077801204272240.
Helmus, L., B. Kelly, and H. Karl. 2013. “The Predictive Accuracy of the Risk Matrix 2000: A Meta-Analysis.” Sexual Offender 
Treatment 8: 1–20.
Hornsby, J., and R. Langton. 1998. “Free Speech and Illocution.” Legal Theory 4 (1): 21–37. doi:10.1017/ 
S1352325200000902.
Jenkins, K. 2016. “Rape Myths and Domestic Abuse Myths as Hermeneutical Injustices.” Journal of Applied Philosophy 33 
(4): 394–421. doi:10.1111/japp.12174.
Kelly, E. 2010. “Philly Stands Up: Inside the Politics and Poetics of Transformative Justice and Community Accountability 
in Sexual Assault Situations.” Social Justice 37 (4): 44–57. doi:10.2307/41478933.
Klein, C., A. Kennedy, and B. Gorzalka. 2008. “Rape Myth Acceptance in Men Who Completed the Prostitution Offender 
Program of British Columbia.” International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 53 (3): 305–315. 
doi:10.1177/0306624X08316969.
Krahé, B., J. Temkin, and S. Bieneck. 2007. “Schema-driven Information Processing in Judgements about Rape.” Applied 
Cognitive Psychology 21 (5): 601–619. doi:10.1002/acp.1297.
Lamb, S. 1999. The Trouble with Blame: Victims, Perpetrators, and Responsibility. London: Harvard University Press.
Langton, R. 1993. “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 22 (4): 293–330. doi:10.2307/2265469.
Littleton, H., and A. Grills-Taquechel. 2011. “Evaluation of an Information Processing Model following Sexual Assault.” 
Psychological Trauma Theory Research Practice and Policy 3 (4): 421–429. doi:10.1037/a0021381.
MacKinnon, C. 1987. Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
MacKinnon, C. 1989. Toward a Feminist Theory of the State. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Manne, K. 2018. Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mason, E. 2015. “Moral Ignorance and Blameworthiness.” Philosophical Studies 172 (11): 3037–3057. doi:10.1007/s11098- 
015-0456-7.
Mason, R. 2011. “Two Kinds of Unknowing.” Hypatia 26 (2): 294–307. doi:10.1111/j.1527-2001.2011.01175.x.
SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY 11
May, L., and R. Strikwerda. 1994. “Men in Groups: Collective Responsibility for Rape.” Hypatia 9 (2): 134–151. doi:10.1111/ 
j.1527-2001.1994.tb00437.x.
Medina, J. 2012. “Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical 
Responsibilities.” Social Epistemology 26 (2): 201–220. doi:10.1080/02691728.2011.652214.
Mills, C. 2007. “White Ignorance.” In Race and the Epistemologies of Ignorance, edited by S. Sullivan and N. Tuana, 11–38. 
Albany: SUNY Press.
Moody-Adams, M. 1999. “The Idea of Moral Progress.” Metaphilosophy 30 (3): 168–185. doi:10.1111/1467-9973.00120
Oakberg, T. 2016. “There Should Not Be Shame in Sharing Responsibility: An Alternative to May’s Social Existentialist 
Vision.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (3): 755–772. doi:10.1007/s10677-016-9684-y.
Peters, J., P. Geiger, L. Nagy, and R. Baer. 2014. “Shame and Borderline Personality Features: The Potential Mediating Role 
of Anger and Anger Rumination.” Personality Disorders: Theory, Research, and Treatment 5: 1–9. doi:10.1037/ 
per0000022.
Peterson, Z., and C. Muehlenhard. 2004. “Was It Rape? The Function of Women’s Rape Myth Acceptance and Definitions 
of Sex in Labelling Their Own Experiences.” Sex Roles 51 (3): 129–144. doi:10.1023/B:SERS.0000037758.95376.00.
Peterson, Z., and C. Muehlenhard. 2011. “A Match-and-Motivation Model of How Women Label Their Nonconsensual 
Sexual Experiences.” Psychology of Women Quarterly 35 (4): 558–570. doi:10.1177/0361684311410210.
Pickard, H. 2011. “Responsibility without Blame: Empathy and the Effective Treatment of Personality Disorder.” 
Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (3): 209–223. doi:10.1353/ppp.2011.0032.
Pickard, H. 2014. “Responsibility without Blame: Therapy, Philosophy, Law.” Prison Service Journal 213: 10–16.
Pohlhaus, G. 2012. “Relational Knowing and Epistemic Injustice: Toward a Theory of Willful Hermeneutical Ignorance.” 
Hypatia 27 (4): 715–735. doi:10.1111/j.1527-2001.2011.01222.
Rosen, G. 2003. “Culpability and Ignorance.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (1): 61–84. doi:10.2307/4545386.
Smiley, M. 2014. “Future-Looking Collective Responsibility: A Preliminary Analysis.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy XXXVIII 
1–11. doi:10.1111/misp.12012.
Smith, H. 1983. “Culpable Ignorance.” Philosophical Review 92 (4): 543–571. doi:10.2307/2184880.
Strawson, P. 2008. Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays. New York: Routledge.
Stuewig, J., J. Tangney, C. Heigel, L. Harty, and L. McCloskey. 2010. “Shaming, Blaming, and Maiming: Functional Links 
among the Moral Emotions, Externalization of Blame, and Aggression.” Journal of Research in Personality 44 (1): 
91–102. doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2009.12.005.
Sullivan, S., and N. Tuana, eds. 2007. Race and the Epistemologies of Ignorance. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Tangney, J., P. Wagner, C. Fletcher, and R. Gramzow. 1992. “Shamed into Anger? The Relation of Shame and Guilt to 
Anger and Self-Reported Aggression.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 62 (4): 669–675. doi:10.1037// 
0022-3514.62.4.669.
Tangney, J., and R. Dearing. 2002. Shame and Guilt. New York: Guilford Press.
Thomaes, S., H. Stegge, T. Olthof, B. Bushman, and J. Nezlek. 2011. “Turning Shame Inside-Out: ‘Humiliated Fury’ in 
Young Adolescents.” Emotion 11 (4): 786–793. doi:10.1037/a0023403.
Wilson, L., and K. Miller. 2016. “Meta-Analysis of the Prevalence of Unacknowledged Rape.” Trauma, Violence & Abuse 17 
(2): 149–159. doi:10.1177/1524838015576391.
Wright, K., G. Gudjonsson, and S. Young. 2008. “An Investigation of the Relationship between Anger and 
Offence-Related Shame and Guilt.” Psychology, Crime and Law 14 (5): 415–423. doi:10.1080/10683160701770369.
Wündisch, J. 2017. “Does Excusable Ignorance Absolve of Liability for Costs?” Philosophical Studies 174 (4): 837–851. 
doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0708-1.
Young, I. M. 2011. Responsibility for Justice. New York: Oxford University Press.
Zheng, R. 2016. “Attributability, Accountability, and Implicit Bias.” In edited by M. Brownstein and J. Saul, Implicit Bias 
and Philosophy, Vol. 2. Chap. 1.3, 62–89. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zimmerman, M. 1997. “Moral Responsibility and Ignorance.” Ethics 107 (3): 410–426. doi:10.2307/2382323.
12 H. HÄNEL
